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Solidarity is cited in the international law doctrine but often denied a self-standing 
legal meaning and normative force in international relations. Its mainstream 
understanding in the international law doctrine is often limited to a socio-political 
notion, which in my view neglects the evidence that one can gather from the practice 
of international law regimes. This happens to be particularly true for the international 
law of Ukraine-EU gas market integration, which operates the term quite widely. The 
present article seeks to repair the said omission by explaining how solidarity is 
pinpointed in this international law framework. This analysis allows picturing 
solidarity in three different legally relevant dimensions (constitutional principle, 
general legal maxim and the duty of cross-border assistance). The latter two dimensions 
present solidarity in terms of specific rights and obligations, which can be helpful in 
cementing solidarity as a legal notion in international law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite being extensively discussed in the academic literature,1 solidarity is 
often viewed with scepticism by international law scholars who consider it 
undefinable or incapable of affecting international relations.  
These conclusions are rarely based on the analysis of European Union law or 
of the international law of European energy cooperation. In fact, in the EU 
Treaties2 solidarity is mentioned by name and is considered one of the 
principles of EU law. It takes specific legal forms in sectoral regulations, in 
particular on energy where it features both as a guiding principle3 and as a 
practical tool to ensure security of natural gas (gas) supply.4  
                                                 
1 For an international law account of the concept, see Ronald St. John MacDonald, 
'Solidarity in the Practice and Discourse of Public International Law' (1996) 8(2) 
Pace International Law Review 259; Rüdiger Wolfrum, 'Solidarity amongst States: 
An Emerging Structural Principle of International Law' in Pierre Marie Dupuy and 
others, Common Values in International Law: Essays in Honour of Christian Tomuschat 
(N.P. Engel Verlag 2006) 1087; Rüdiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima (eds), Solidarity: 
A Structural Principle of International Law (Springer 2010); Holger Hestermeyer and 
others (eds), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum 
(Brill 2012); Markus Tobias Kotzur and Kirsten Schmalenbach, 'Solidarity Among 
Nations' (2014) 52(1) Archiv des Völkerrechts 68. 
2 Treaty on European Union (TEU); Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). 
3 TFEU, art 194.  
4 'New rules to secure gas supplies in Europe bring more solidarity' (European 
Commission, 12 September 2017) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
3203_en.htm> accessed 02 December 2018. 
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Relatively more successful than the internal market for electricity,5 the EU's 
internal gas market has been instrumental in spreading the Union's 
regulatory approaches beyond its borders. This process is forged through 
international law arrangements, including association agreements as well as 
the Treaty Establishing the Energy Community (EnC).6  
In the Energy Community, Ukraine is the second biggest member (after the 
EU), based on gas market parameters.7 It is a critical route for transporting 
gas of a single Russian exporter, Gazprom, to the EU and wider Europe, 
including the Balkans.8 Adding that to Europe's general dependence on 
Russian gas,9 Ukraine is the crucial security factor for the whole of the Energy 
Community. 
Since 2014 when Ukraine made a strategic turn from Russia in its gas policy,10 
legal instruments of Ukraine-EU integration in this sector have absorbed 
numerous references and instruments of solidarity from the European Union 
legal order.  
                                                 
5 'Continued gas wholesale market integration, but electricity market integration at 
risk' (ACER, 06 October 2017) <http://www.acer.europa.eu/Media/News/Pages/ 
Continued-gas-wholesale-market-integration,-but-electricity-market-
integration-at-risk.aspx> accessed 02 December 2018.  
6 Treaty Establishing the Energy Community (signed 27 June 2014; entered into 
force 01 July 2006) OJ L198/18 (EnC). For the most recent text of the treaty, see 
<https://www.energy-community.org/legal/treaty.html>. 
7 Energy Community Secretariat, 'Annual Implementation Report' (2017) 
<https://www.energy-community.org/implementation/IR2017.html> accessed 02 
December 2018. 
8 DG Energy, 'Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets, Market Observatory for 
Energy: Volume 11 (issue 2; second quarter of 2018)' 11 (figure 9). See also Regulation 
2017/1938 (n 105) Annex I where the risk group 'Ukraine' involves: Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia.  
9 DG Energy (n 8) 9. See also Energy Community Secretariat, 'Knocking on the EU's 
Door through the Energy Community: Integration of Western Balkans into the 
Pan-European Energy Market' (2018) 8 <https://www.energy-community.org> 
accessed 02 December 2018 ('Russia continues to dominate the gas market [in the 
Western Balkans] in such a way that would be unacceptable in the EU'). 
10 Kataryna Wolczuk, 'Managing the flows of gas and rules: Ukraine between the EU 
and Russia' (2016) 57(1) Eurasian Geography and Economics 113. 
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This article seeks to shed light on solidarity in international law by using the 
example of a field that is not commonly explored by international lawyers. In 
my view, the non-recognition of solidarity as a legal notion is partially caused 
by the lack of its exact description. By establishing a useful interface between 
international and EU law on the subject, our analysis concentrates on the 
identification of clear-cut forms of solidarity, especially its transcription into 
specific, positive (to do) and negative (not to do) obligations. In Section II, 
since we are primarily concerned with the role of solidarity in international 
law, we offer a working definition of solidarity, along with its basic normative 
content, derived from the international law doctrine. In Section III, this 
definition is validated in the EU legal order, which helps to delineate 
different legally relevant dimensions of solidarity, thus signalling that its 
reading as a socio-political, 'meta-legal' notion is incomplete. These 
dimensions are then identified in the international law framework of 
Ukraine-EU gas market integration (Section IV), where the EU law 
constructs operate in a truly international law setting. Section V summarises 
the conclusions from this exercise. 
II. SOLIDARITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1. How can Solidarity be Defined for International Law Purposes? 
What do we mean by solidarity in an international law context? An 
authoritative commentator remarks that 'the expression ''solidarity'' (a) 
scarcely appears in any international treaty of note; and (b) is missing from 
landmark statements articulating the general practice of States accepted as 
law, namely, custom'.11 More drastically, another acknowledged lawyer notes 
that solidarity 'is too abstract and too indefinite in contours and contents to 
become a normative concept that produces steering effects on States' 
behaviour in international relations'.12  
It is indeed true that solidarity is not expressly mentioned in the Charter of 
the United Nations. Neither is it listed among fundamental principles of 
                                                 
11 'Discussion Following the Presentation by Philipp Dann' (intervention by Yoram 
Dinstein) in Wolfrum/Kojima (n 1) 78.  
12 Ibid 42.  
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international law under the Friendly Relations Declaration.13 The UN 
Desertification Convention14 is one of the few universal international treaties 
referring to solidarity but not clarifying its meaning. No reputable 
international law interpreter (e.g. International Court of Justice, 
International Law Commission) have had the right occasion to express itself 
on the universal definition of solidarity. The history has known attempts to 
denote solidarity in political acts, namely as part of the legal toolkit of the 
New International Economic Order15 and in relation to the UN Millennium 
Development Goals.16 However, they arguably failed to gain universal 
recognition, proposing an asymmetrical treatment of developing countries.17 
It is thus the legal scholarship (in academia, governmental and inter-
governmental public service) who have shaped the concept of solidarity in 
international law for purposes of domestic and international decision-
making.  
                                                 
13 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
UNGA Res 2625 (24 October 1970).  
14 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa 
(adopted 17 June 1994; entered into force 26 December 1996) 1954 UNTS 3, art 3(b). 
15 Report of the Secretary-General, 'Progressive Development of the Principles and 
Norms of International Law relating to the New International Economic Order' 
(1984) UN Doc A/39/504/Add.1, 91. See also UNGA Res 55/107 (14 Mar 2001) UN 
Doc A/RES/55/107, UNGA Res 59/193 (20 Dec 2004) UN Doc A/RES/59/193 ('(f) 
Solidarity, as a fundamental value, by virtue of which global challenges must be 
managed in a way that distributes costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic 
principles of equity and social justice and ensures that those who suffer or who 
benefit the least receive help from those who benefit the most'). 
Kotzur/Schmalenbach (n 1) 74. 
16 United Nations Millennium Declaration, UNGA Res 55/2 (18 Sep 2000) 
('Solidarity. Global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs 
and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice. 
Those who suffer or who benefit least deserve help from those who benefit most.'). 
See Philip Dann 'Solidarity and the Law of Development Cooperation' in 
Wolfrum/Kojima (n 1) 64. 
17 MacDonald (n 1) 279-280; Bruno Simma, 'From bilateralism to community interest 
in international law' (1994) 250 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit 
International 217, 237. 
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According to Wolfrum (referring to Scheuner), 'the idea that the principle of 
solidarity should guide states in their relations was discussed between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries'.18 Yet, it is hard to trace the evolution of 
solidarity as a separate international law notion before the time when the 
term itself was formulated and became part of the mainstream linguistic 
practice.19 Derived from Roman law (obligatio in solidum),20 solidarity appears 
in the 1804 French Civil Code in a narrow legal context of shared 
responsibility, but '[t]he transformation of the legal concept of solidarity into 
a political concept seems to have begun in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century'.21 Leroux (1797-1871) is credited as the 'first theorist of solidarity' in 
print thanks to his 1840 publication.22 This must be the time when the term 
migrated to England and Germany.23 Both the Oxford English Dictionary24 
and the Digital Dictionary of the German Language25 indicate the French 
origin of the word and give the earliest reference thereto to the 1840s.  
It is in the mid-19th century that the 'solidarity theory of law' was developed 
by Duguit (1859-1928) and extended to the field of international law by Scelle 
                                                 
18 Rüdiger Wolfrum, 'Solidarity' in Dinah Shelton (ed), Oxford Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 402; Ulrich 
Scheuner, 'Solidarität unter den Nationen als Grundsatz in der gegenwartigen 
internationalen Gemeinschaft' in Jost Delbruck, Knut Ipsen, Dietrich Rauschning 
(eds), Recht im Dienst des Friedens: Festschrift fur Eberhard Menzel (Duncker & 
Humbolt 1975).  
19 Steinar Stjerno, Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea (Cambridge University 
Press 2004) 25 ('The idea existed before the term became widespread, and the term 
was in general use before its modern meaning had developed.').  
20 Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civil Friendship to a Global Legal Community 
(The MIT Press 2005) 2. 
21 Stjerno (n 19) 27.  
22 Laurence Wilde, Global Solidarity (Edinburgh University Press 2013) 20-21. See 
Pierre Leroux, De l'humanité (Perrotin 1840). 
23 Stjerno (n 19) 30.  
24 OED Online, <http://www.oed.com> accessed 02 December 2018. See Malcolm 
Ross, 'Solidarity: A New Constitutional Paradigm for the EU?' in Malcolm Ross 
and Yuri Borgmann-Prebil (eds), Promoting Solidarity in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 23 ('[t]he first mention of solidarity in the Oxford English 
Dictionary only appears in the mid-nineteenth century'). 
25 Das Wortauskunftssystem zur deutschen Sprache in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 
<https://www.dwds.de> accessed 02 December 2018. 
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(1878-1961),26 becoming one of the mainstream doctrines describing the 
origin of international law.27 Duguit explains solidarity in the context of 
individual freedom: 
once a man becomes part of the society and because he is a social being, there 
are born for him a series of obligations, namely to exercise his own physical, 
intellectual and moral activity and to abstain from doing whatever can hinder 
the development of others, so that in the end it is not correct to say that a 
man has the right to exercise his activity; rather he has the duty not to hinder 
the activity of others, the duty to facilitate and assist within his powers28  
and admits that '[this] duty can be founded only on the principle superior to 
the man, on the ideal to be pursued, on the goal to be achieved'.29 
Interestingly, he recognizes that the word 'solidarity' is quite often used 
indiscriminately.30  
For Scelle, solidarity can be driven by either innate similarities or forces 
unleashed by the division of labour,31 but in any event it is a product of social 
reality reaching out to the international plane; this metalegal (métajuridique)32 
phenomenon pre-determines the existence of socially necessary 
international legal orders.33 His contemporary colleagues in theory and 
practice of international law likewise appealed to the socially cohesive quality 
of solidarity.34 They all thus viewed solidarity as a socio-political notion 
rather than as a legal concept formalised in positive law.35  
                                                 
26 Armin von Bogdandy 'Opening Address' in Wolfrum/Kojima (n 1) 2. 
27 Oriol Casanovas y La Rosa, Unity and Pluralism in Public International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 6-10. 
28 Léon Duguit, Souveraineté et liberté: leçons faites à l'Université Colombia (New-York), 
1920-1921 (Librairie Felix Alcan 1922) 142 (author's translation).  
29 Ibid 144.  
30 Duguit (n 28) 147. 
31 Georges Scelle 'Règles générales du droit de la paix' (1933) 46 Recueil des Cours de 
l'Académie de Droit International 327, 339-340.  
32 Ibid 334-335.  
33 Ibid 350.  
34 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press 2009) 287-352. 
35 Although it cannot be excluded that this image of solidarity was influenced by the 
Code Civil. See Koskenniemi (n 34) 289.  
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Modern scholars locate solidarity in individual treaty provisions, principles 
and branches of international law such as: Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations,36 Articles 41-42, 49-50 of the UN Charter,37 Article 1 of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions,38 Article I of the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs 1994,39 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;40 erga omnes 
obligations,41 collective security,42 the responsibility to protect,43 sustainable 
development and common but differentiated responsibilities;44 international 
development law,45 international human rights law,46 and international 
refugee and disaster relief law.47 In doing so, they mostly rely on some 
ordinary, often dictionary meaning of solidarity, usually skipping a 
complicated exercise when they would need to determine the full content of 
the term for international law purposes. Some even consider this exercise 
doomed to failure.48   
However, the many doctrinal applications of solidarity have similarities 
which can be summarised to form a non-contentious definition. Taking 
                                                 
36 MacDonald (n 1) 261. 
37 Karel Wellens, 'Revisiting Solidarity as a (Re-)Emerging Constitutional Principle: 
Some Further Reflections' in Wolfrum/Kojima (n 1) 28-30. 
38 Ibid 20. 
39 Ibid 22. See also Rüdiger Wolfrum, Solidarity amongst States (n 1) 1096-1098. 
40 Rüdiger Wolfrum, Solidarity amongst States (n 1) 1091-1092. 
41 Wellens (n 37) 22-28.  
42 Abdul G Koroma, 'Solidarity: Evidence of an Emerging International Legal 
Principle' in Hestermeyer (n 1) 104-105; Rüdiger Wolfrum, Solidarity amongst 
States (n 1) 1092-1093. 
43 Wellens (n 37) 12; Koroma (n 42) 119-123; Laurence Boisson de Chazournes 
'Responsibility to Protect: Reflecting Solidarity?' in Wolfrum/Kojima (n 1) 94-95. 
44 Rüdiger Wolfrum, Solidarity amongst States (n 1) 1094-1096; Koroma (n 42) 111-
113.  
45 Kotzur/Schmalenbach (n 1) 84-85.  
46 Theo van Boven 'The Right to Peace as an Emerging Solidarity Right' in Eva Rieter 
and Henri Waele, Evolving Principles of International Law: Studies in Honour of Karel 
C. Wellens (Brill 2011).  
47 Nele Matz-Lück, 'Solidarität, Souveränität und Völkerrecht: Grundzüge einer 
internationalen Solidargemeinschaft zur Hilfe bei Naturkatastrophen' in 
Hestermeyer (n 1). 
48 Kotzur/Schmalenbach (n 1) 72. 
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inspiration from Dann's presentation at the 2008 convention,49 I propose to 
define solidarity as a relationship generated by the interplay of three key 
elements: common values and objectives; mutuality; and equality.  
For solidarity to exist, there must be a 'sense of community or commonality'50 
and a recognition that common values and objectives can be secured only if 
everybody in the community participates in the joint efforts (mutuality).51 
This requires that the values and objectives must themselves be such as to 
depend on everyone's input. They must be susceptible of securing a 
community. Short-term or one-off objectives are unlikely to solidify mutual 
obligations. Mutuality also pre-determines that solidarity is a relationship 
among formal equals. When everyone contributes to the common cause 
which is otherwise non-achievable, 'solidarity changes the rules from the 
zero-sum game – ''In order to win, someone else must lose'' - to ''No one wins 
unless everyone wins'''.52 Then even the least powerful has a say and 
simultaneously bears the burden of common efforts. Equality has formed 'the 
revolutionary core of the concept of solidarity',53 providing a historical 
alternative to philanthropy and mercy. We can thus visualise solidarity as a 
wheel where the hub represents common objectives, the rim signifies equality 
(i.e. equal distance from the hub) and spokes stand for mutuality holding 
together the whole structure: 
                                                 
49 Dann (n 16) 61.  
50 Simma (n 17) 238 (referring to MacDonald).  
51 Dann (n 16) 61, fn 20 (referring to MacDonald). 
52 MacDonald (n 1) 281. 
53 Dann (n 16) 57. 
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Figure 1: Visualisation of solidarity as a socio-political notion 
This understanding of solidarity seems the most basic and the least 
controversial. Taken in its ideal form, solidarity can thus be distinguished 
from adjacent socio-political concepts such as cooperation (where mutuality 
is not as paramount to the achievement of the set goal) and loyalty54 (where 
common goals are pursued in such a way that equality is undermined). It fits 
well into the consensual paradigm of international law, provides a healthy 
alternative to previously discarded attempts to define solidarity but does not 
fully cut away from those.55 All this makes it suitable for test in real-life legal 
regimes.  
2. How can Solidarity Affect International Relations?  
To affect international relations, solidarity must be expressed in terms of 
legal rights and obligations of solidarity bearers, i.e. members of a community 
                                                 
54 Kotzur/Schmalenbach (n 1) 74. 
55 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
UNGA Res 3201 (1 May 1974) 3 ('International co-operation for development is the 
shared goal and common duty of all countries. Thus the political, economic and 
social well-being of present and future generations depends more than ever on co-
operation between all the members of the international community on the basis of 
sovereign equality and the removal of the disequilibrium that exists between 
them.').  
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bound by 'mutual concern'.56 The definition suggested above does not 
however specify the personality of such solidarity-bearers. Their identity 
depends on the character of common values that are subject to convergence. 
Where such values are of interest to each and every individual ('solidarity 
with respect to humankind'57), then the required level of mutuality becomes 
hard to achieve. This showcases the basic paradox of solidarity which 'turns 
on its simultaneous appeal to unity and universality and its dependence in 
practice on antagonisms between particular groups'.58  
A community can consist of individuals as e.g. advocated by Scelle.59 
However, even his vision pre-supposed that individuals would exercise 
solidarity through professional associations acting across borders,60 i.e. 
through an appropriate medium. Since in this article we inspect specific 
international law instruments (see Section IV), we are best positioned to 
analyse the normative impact of solidarity at the level of states and other 
subjects of international law whose legal personality emanates from the state.  
In this connection, several prominent international law scholars opine:  
[solidarity] is an understanding among formal equals that they will refrain 
from actions that would significantly interfere with the realization and 
maintenance of common goals or interests. Solidarity requires an 
understanding and acceptance by every member of the community that it 
consciously conceives of its own interests as being inextricable from the 
interests of the whole. No state may choose to exercise its power in a way 
that gravely threatens the integrity of the community.61  
*** 
[t]he principle of solidarity envisages equalizing deficits which result from 
the fact that jurisdictional powers of States are necessarily limited. Therefore 
States acting merely on an individual basis cannot provide satisfactorily for 
solutions which the interests of the community demand. Such demands 
                                                 
56 Andrew Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their 
Normative Significance (Cambridge University Press 2003) 27.  
57 'Discussion Following the Presentation by Karel Wellens' (intervention by Fred 
Morrison) in Wolfrum/Kojima (n 1) 51. 
58 Wilde (n 22) 18. See also Ross (n 24) 33. 
59 Scelle (n 31) 43-44.  
60 Koskenniemi (n 34) 267.  
61 MacDonald (n 1) 290; Simma (n 17) 238. 
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require a common action. … generally speaking … States in shaping their 
positions in international relations should not only take into consideration 
their own individual interests but also those of other States or the interests 
of the community of States or both.62 
These statements expose the basic normative content of solidarity, i.e. to 
motivate and restrain international law subjects in their decision-making 
which is the result of their belonging to a qualified community. However, due 
to the lack of precision they can be partially blamed for promoting an overly 
ambiguous picture of solidarity. I seek to repair this deficiency through the 
analysis of a specific international law regime endowed with key elements of 
solidarity originating from the EU law. 
III. SOLIDARITY IN EU LAW  
In the EU Treaties, the number of references to solidarity is striking 
compared to other international treaties.63 Though intuitive, this difference 
could be of certain legal significance.64  
In TEU, solidarity qualifies the system of Union values in the context of 
relations between peoples,65 generations,66 men and women,67 as well as 
Member States between themselves, with the Union and the outside world. 
                                                 
62 Rüdiger Wolfrum, Solidarity amongst States (n 1) 1087-1088. See also Christian 
Tomuschat 'International law: ensuring the survival of mankind on the eve of a new 
century: general course on public international law' (1999) 281 Recueil des Cours de 
l'Académie de Droit International 9, 261 (where he refers to 'a duty of cooperation' 
that trumps sovereignty). 
63 Marcus Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 
36-37; Hanspeter Neuhold 'Common Security: The Litmus Test of International 
Solidarity' in Wolfrum/Kojima (n 1) 212. 
64 Dann (n 17) 64, fn 31 ('It is interesting to speculate why the word [solidarity] is used 
so little in legal documents. During the time of the Cold War there was probably 
strong resistance on the side of the industrialised countries to use it, since solidarity 
was certainly rather a word of the then Second World, i.e. the socialist countries. 
But today, after the end of the Cold War, there would not be any need to avoid the 
notion anymore; so why is it still not used? Is it just not so essential? Is it really 
vague? Or is it considered to entail real duties?'). 
65 TEU, recital (7). 
66 TEU, art 3(3). 
67 TEU, art 2. 
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Under Article 3(3) TEU, solidarity among Member States – alongside 
economic, social and territorial cohesion – is coined as the goal of the Union. 
Moreover, TEU bases the EU's external action on the principle of solidarity, 
which, among others, 'ha[s] inspired [the Union's] own creation, 
development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider 
world'.68 TFEU refers to solidarity predominantly in areas of energy 
(specifically as regards the internal energy market69 and delivery 
disruptions70) as well as of joint response to terrorist attacks, natural and 
man-made disasters.71  
Not surprisingly, international lawyers see the degree of solidarity among EU 
Member States as unprecedented.72 For some EU law scholars, solidarity has 
achieved nothing short of a constitutional role.73 If so, can one still argue that 
solidarity in the EU legal order is 'too abstract'?  
Among many contexts of solidarity in EU law,74 I have identified two which 
seem the most relevant for further analysis of Ukraine-EU gas market 
integration.75 Firstly, it is Article 4(3) TEU which migrated word-for-word to 
Article 6 EnC. Secondly, it is the EU acquis on the security of gas supply, 
which promotes solidarity as a specific legal tool and is likewise included in 
the bilateral integration agenda. Combined with its reading as a 
constitutional principle, solidarity is thus analysed in three legally relevant 
dimensions (to be extrapolated to the international plane in Section IV). 
                                                 
68 TEU, art 21(1). See also TEU, art 3(5).  
69 TFEU, art 194.  
70 TFEU, art 122.  
71 TFEU, art 222 (the so-called 'solidarity clause'). See Kotzur/Schmalenbach (n 1) 78-
80. 
72 Neuhold (n 63) 211; Alain Pellet, 'Les fondements juridiques internationaux du droit 
communautaire' (1994) V/2 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 
193, 268 ('la solidarité plus forte entre les Etats membres que celle qui unit (?) les 
éléments de la “communauté internationale”). 
73 Ross (n 24) 45; Kotzur/Schmalenbach (n 1) 73; Klamert (n 63) 35.  
74 Ross (n 24) 41.  
75 EnC, art 94.  
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1. Article 4(3) TEU: Constitutional Principle and General Legal Maxim 
Last two lines76 of Article 4(3) TEU (previously – Article 10 EC, 5 EEC and 86 
ECSC) stipulate that EU Member States shall take any appropriate measure, 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the 
EU Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union and 
that they shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's 
objectives.  
That the said legal formula (which does not refer to the notion by name) 
embodies solidarity has been noted by legal scholars77 as well as by EU law 
actors themselves. The Court of Justice of the EU and its predecessors 
(CJEU, the Court) explicitly recognize that:  
The solidarity which is at the basis of these obligations as of the whole of the 
Community system in accordance with the undertaking provided for in 
Article 5 of the Treaty, is continued for the benefit of the States in the 
procedure for mutual assistance provided for in Article 108 where a Member 
State is seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of 
payments.78  
The Court reiterated this position implicitly in at least two cases.79 
Governments and national courts on several occasions relied on the cited 
provision as embodying solidarity.80  
                                                 
76 The first line was added to this article only in TEU.   
77 MacDonald (n 1) 297; Ross (n 24) 42; Klamert (n 63) 31-32.  
78 C-6/69 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1969:68, para 16. 
79 C-212/04 Konstantinos Adeneler and Others v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (ELOG) 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:443, Opinion of AG Kokott, para 48 (referring to C-129/96 Inter-
Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Région wallonne ECLI:EU:C:1997:628, para 45); 
Case C-304/02 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:444, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para 8 (referring to Case 44/84 
Derrick Guy Edmund Hurd v Kenneth Jones (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) 
ECLI:EU:C:1986:2, paras 57-58). 
80 Joined Cases C-63/90 and C-67/90 Portuguese Republic and Kingdom of Spain v 
Council of the European Communities ECLI:EU:C:1992:381, para 51; Case C-453/00 
Kühne & Heitz NV v Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren ECLI:EU:C:2004:17, para 
19. 
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On its face, the cited Commission v France associates solidarity with the duty 
of mutual assistance. Yet, other judgements demonstrate that Article 4(3) 
TEU encompasses a broader set of duties designed to safeguard the essence 
of the EU legal order, which fits into the parameters of solidarity set in 
Section II. As early as in Costa v ENEL, CJEU coins 'reciprocity' as the basis 
of the EU's legal system and adds that: 
[t]he executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to 
another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the 
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty set out in Article 5(2) and giving 
rise to the discrimination prohibited by Article 7.81 
Thus, common objectives, 'reciprocity' and intolerance to discrimination are 
all cited as reasons to reject the untenable position of a Member State which 
negates its national court's right to seek a preliminary ruling from CJEU. 
Although in our definition solidarity is based on mutuality rather than 
reciprocity,82 the difference between the two is not always scrutinised and the 
terms are often used interchangeably.  
For the Court, it is indeed what we call mutuality that lies at the heart of 
Article 4(3) TEU. In another case, it states that the Member State's refusal to 
implement a regulation 'undermines the efficacy of the provision decided 
upon in common, while at the same time taking an undue advantage to the 
detriment of its partners in view of the free circulation of goods'.83 This 
distortion, according to CJEU, 'strikes at the fundamental basis of the 
Community legal order'.84 The free-rider problem thus described is 
characteristic of a mutuality relationship: due to strong dependencies where 
one member benefits, all others suffer. In organised systems (e.g. harmonised 
VAT), this can even lead to a tangible shift in financial burdens.85 
Importantly, CJEU also mentions that this unlawful situation 'brings into 
                                                 
81 Case 6-64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, 593-594. 
82 Dann (n 15) 61, fn 20.  
83 Case 39-72 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic 
ECLI:EU:C:1973:13, para 21.  
84 Ibid, para 25. 
85 Case C-493/15 Agenzia delle Entrate v Marco Identi ECLI:EU:C:2017:219, paras 16-
19.  
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question the equality of Member States before Community law',86 thus 
supporting the third element of our definition. 
The ample CJEU jurisprudence not only helps to uncover the constitutional 
dimension of solidarity but also to depart from its elusive image of a socio-
political notion. Distancing from principles and institutions specific to the 
Union, most fundamentally solidarity can be said to mean: 
- Duty of coordinated action: 'in a field … in which worthwhile results 
can only be attained thanks to the co-operation of all', members may 
not adopt unilateral measures outside the common framework;87 
where, however, the collective interest is in danger, a member must 
step in (but, again, after effectively consulting others);88  
- Duty of uniformity: members must ensure uniform application of 
common rules;89 
- Duty of enforcement: members must ensure effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive penalties for violation of common rules90 and take 
necessary actions to combat fraud;91 
                                                 
86 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic (n 83) para 24. 
87 Case 141/78 French Republic v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:225, para 8; John Temple Lang, 'The Duty of Sincere 
Cooperation as a Lawyering Strategy' in Fernanda Nicola, Bill Davies (eds), EU 
Law Stories Contextual and Critical Histories of European Jurisprudence (Cambridge 
University Press 2017). 
88 Case 32/79 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland ECLI:EU:C:1981:93, paras 25, 28; Case C-105/02 Commission of 
the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany ECLI:EU:C:2006:637, para 
60. 
89 Joined cases 205 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH and others v Federal Republic 
of Germany ECLI:EU:C:1983:233, para 17.  
90 Case C-7/90 Criminal proceedings against Paul Vandevenne, Marc Wilms, Jozef 
Mesotten and Wilms Transport NV ECLI:EU:C:1991:363, para 11. 
91 Case C-352/92 Milchwerke Köln/Wuppertal eG v Hauptzollamt Köln-Rheinau 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:294, para 23. 
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- Duty of diligence: members must ensure correct use of common 
resources,92 including by promptly countering cases of misuse;93  
- Duty of transparency: members must provide necessary information 
to establish the availability of common resources94 and their correct 
use;95  
- Duty of trust: members must rely on representations that others make 
within the system of shared responsibility;96 
- Duty of external abstention: members may not enter into external 
commitments 'capable of affecting [common] rules already adopted 
[…] or of altering their scope'.97,98 
This bundle of duties constitutes a general legal maxim of solidarity and 
represents its second legally relevant dimension.  
2. EU acquis on Security of Gas Supply: Duty of Cross-Border Assistance  
The third dimension of solidarity can be observed through the secondary 
legislation on the security of gas supply approved under Article 194 TFEU. 
This treaty provision crystallizes the Union policy direction on energy99 and 
                                                 
92 Case C-8/88 Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:241, para 20.  
93 Case C-34/89 Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:353, para 12.  
94 Case C-275/04 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:641, para 83. 
95 Case C-38/06 European Commission v Portuguese Republic ECLI:EU:C:2010:108, para 
70. 
96 Case C-202/97 Fitzwilliam Executive Search Ltd v Bestuur van het Landelijk instituut 
sociale verzekeringen ECLI:EU:C:2000:75, paras 51-52.  
97 Opinion 2/91 delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228 (1) of the EEC 
Treaty - Convention Nº 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning safety in 
the use of chemicals at work ECLI:EU:C:1993:106, para 11. 
98 See also John Temple Lang, 'The Development by the Court of Justice of the 
Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Community Institutions 
Under Article 10 EC' (2007) 31(5) Fordham International Law Journal 1483. 
99 Leigh Hancher and Francesco Maria Salerno, 'Energy Policy After Lisbon' in 
Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon 
(Oxford University Press 2012); Rafael Leal-Arcas and Andrew Filis, The Energy 
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mandates its pursuit 'in a spirit of solidarity between Member States'. 
According to Ahner/Glachlant, '[t]here is an obligation flowing from Article 
194 to pursue solidarity actively'.100   
The security of gas supply broadly means the availability of the technical and 
resource capacity to satisfy gas demand in different circumstances,101 and it is 
currently listed as the first objective of the Energy Union (alongside solidarity 
and trust).102 Article 194 TFEU has given rise to two pivotal Union-wide acts 
on the security of gas supply,103 namely: Regulation 994/2010104 (now 
                                                 
Community and the Energy Charter Treaty: Special Legal Regimes, their Systemic 
Relationship to the EU, and their Dispute Settlement Arrangements (2014) 12(2) 
Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence 1, 11-12.  
100 Nicole Ahner and Jean-Michel Glachant, 'The Building of Energy Solidarity in the 
EU' in Jean-Michel Glachant and others (eds), A New Architecture for EU Gas 
Security of Supply (Claeys & Casteels Publishing 2012) 145. 
101 Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
Directive 2003/55/EC {2009} OJ L211/94, art 2(32) (referred to in Regulation 
994/2010 (n 104) art 2, Regulation 2017/1938 (n 105) art 2(1)). For different 
approaches to defining energy security in the EU, see Leal/Filis (n 99) 10-11.   
102 Commission, 'A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-
Looking Climate Change Policy' COM(2015) 80 final; Natasha A Georgiou and 
Andrea Rocco, 'Energy governance in EU-Russia energy relations: paving the way 
towards an energy union' (2017) Institute of European Law Working Paper 01/2017 
12-17 <http://epapers.bham.ac.uk/2944> accessed 02 December 2018. 
103 There is another interesting legal act adopted under this TFEU Article 194, 
namely: Decision (EU) 2017/684 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
5 April 2017 on establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to 
intergovernmental agreements and non-binding instruments between Member 
States and third countries in the field of energy, and repealing Decision No 
994/2012/EU {2017} OJ L99/1. However, as explained above, here we dwell upon the 
legal rules and mechanisms coming under the topic of Ukraine-EU gas market 
integration. So far Decision (EU) 2017/684 is not part of the Energy Community 
acquis and its prospects to become one are unclear.   
104 Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and 
repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC {2010} OJ L295/1. 
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repealed) and Regulation 2017/1938105 (effective as of 01 November 2017). The 
two documents have the same philosophy: while the ultimate security 
depends on a situational combination of factors, it is the state of 
preparedness and resilience that can be managed constantly and 
systematically. They are identical in preaching preference towards security 
built by market forces with exceptional state interventions when 'the market 
can no longer deliver the required gas supplies'.106 But their reliance on 
solidarity as a last-resort, non-market-based security of supply tool differs 
significantly.  
Regulation 994/2010 was born out of unprecedented events of January 2009 
when for almost two weeks Russian gas transit through Ukraine was halted, 
leaving the EU without the critical supply source.107 Despite the legislation in 
force at that time (i.e. Directive 2004/67/EC), the EU proved poorly prepared 
to counter a disruption of such a magnitude.108 The Commission's legislative 
proposal launched in July 2009 under then effective Article 95 EC contained 
few references to solidarity109 (all of which survived in the final text) but failed 
to clarify its meaning. When adopted, Regulation 994/2010 read in the 
preamble that 'Member States should devise measures to exercise solidarity' 
associating it with agreements between gas undertakings for additional gas 
volumes and fair and equitable compensation for them.110 The body of this 
Regulation gave a single practical instruction on solidarity:  
in a spirit of solidarity, the Competent Authority shall identify in the 
Preventive Action Plan and the Emergency Plan how any increased supply 
                                                 
105 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and 
repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 {2017} OJ L280/1. 
106 Regulation 994/2010 (n 104) art 1; Regulation 2017/1938 (n 105) art 1.  
107 Ahner/Glachant (n 100) 123-153.  
108 Commission, 'Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard 
security of gas supply and repealing Directive 2004/67/EC – The January 2009 gas 
supply disruption to the EU: an assessment' COM (2009) 363.  
109 Commission, 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing 
Directive 2004/67/EC' COM/2009/0363 final. 
110 Regulation 994/2010 (n 104) recital (36).  
124 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 11 No. 2 
 
standard or additional obligation imposed on natural gas undertakings may 
be temporarily reduced in the event of a Union or regional emergency.111  
This meant that only additional gas amounts were at stake and could be 
shared with the Member State in an emergency.  
Recently enacted Regulation 2017/1938 deals with this problem – How to 
compensate for missing gas in a Member State affected by a substantial gas 
shortage? – differently. Its solution is that (roughly)112 
[c]ustomers others than households, essential social services and district 
heating cannot continue to be supplied with gas in a given Member State - 
even if it is not in an emergency situation - as long as households, essential 
social services and district heating are not being supplied in another Member 
State in emergency to which the first country's transmission network is 
connected.113  
This is the common objective behind the 'solidarity measure of a last resort'114 
for the first time introduced in a Union regulation.115 Triggered in a dire 
situation where at the affected state level all efforts have been exhausted and 
the neighbouring states have lowered additional supply standards applicable 
to their gas undertakings,116 it should be operationalized through separate 
inter-state arrangements.117 However, the Regulation sets forth mandatory 
                                                 
111 Ibid, art 8(2). 
112 While this excerpt from the proposal aptly captures the basic principle, the exact 
boundaries of the solidarity measure are specified through the definition of 
'solidarity protected customers' and other provisions of the Regulation 
(Regulation 2017/1938 (n 105) arts 2(6), 13(1)).  
113 Commission, 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing 
Regulation (EU) No 994/2010' COM/2016/052 final, p.12.  
114 Regulation 2017/1938 (n 105) art 1.   
115 Ibid, recital (45).  
116 Ibid, art 13(3).  
117 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/177 of 2 February 2018 on the elements 
to be included in the technical, legal and financial arrangements between Member 
States for the application of the solidarity mechanism under Article 13 of 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply {2018} OJ L32/52. 
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elements of this legal mechanism and creates the necessary environment for 
its subsistence rooted in mutuality and equality.  
Specifically, the integrity of the internal gas market requires that no Member 
State, by taking unilateral action, disturb its proper functioning even in face 
of a gas crisis.118 Instead, Member States are required to prepare for an 
emergency and coordinate their steps with others, including the European 
Commission. Regulation 2017/1938 lays down a harmonized format for this 
exercise: mandatory templates for risk assessment as well as for Preventive 
and Emergency Action Plans;119 joint development of regional chapters and 
their incorporation into national plans120 based on a common risk assessment 
conducted in risk groups;121 review of national plans by the Commission.122 It 
also stipulates that only pre-agreed actions shall be deployed in an emergency, 
except for 'duly justified exceptional circumstances' (in which case 
immediate notification to the Commission and Member States in the same 
risk group is warranted).123 Understanding the aggregated security of supply 
situation in the Union is another mutual challenge, which the Regulation 
handles through information provision obligations related to most relevant 
gas contracts.124 
To sustain equality, the Regulation employs a uniform definition of 
solidarity-protected customers125 and harmonized supply and infrastructure 
standards of conduct for gas undertakings (including the obligation to reduce 
increased supply standards to a common level where the neighbouring 
Member State suffers a gas disruption).126 It imposes an obligation on the 
receiving Member State to pay all reasonable costs associated with the 
delivered gas to the Member State providing solidarity (inter-state 'fair and 
                                                 
118 Regulation 2017/1938 (n 105) recital (7). 
119 Ibid, arts 7(5), 8(5).   
120 Ibid, art 8(3). 
121 Ibid, art 7(2).  
122 Ibid, art 8(7)-(9).   
123 Regulation 2017/1938 (n 105) recital (7), art 11(4).  
124 Ibid, art 14.  
125 Ibid, recital (24), art 6(1).   
126 Ibid, arts 5-6, 11(3).   
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prompt compensation')127 and a duty to select the most advantageous offer of 
solidarity among offers made.128  
These and other elements of Regulation 2017/1938129 mirror the set of legal 
duties derived from Article 4(3) TEU. This indicates that the three 
dimensions of the notion in EU law spring on a single ideological basis and 
add up to a wholesome picture of solidarity. As opined by AG Mengozzi in 
relation to Article 194 TFEU:130  
This reference to solidarity between Member States […] is made in a context 
in which the principle of solidarity between Member States has taken on a 
character that could be defined as a 'constitutional principle'. The idea of 
solidarity between Member States is not only expressed in various places in 
the Treaties, but also, under the third subparagraph of Article 3(3) of the 
TEU, constitutes one of the objectives of the Union.131 […] [I]n interpreting 
the provisions of Regulation No 994/2010, account must be taken of the 
fundamental role played by the principle of solidarity between Member 
States in the context of that regulation.132 
Solidarity can thus be said to permeate the EU legal order. Starting as a 
constitutional principle and panning out in specific legal duties under EU 
Treaties and secondary legal acts, it affects international relations within the 
Union. It can likewise affect international relations of the Union and the 
outside world where the relevant international law framework is in place.  
                                                 
127 Ibid, art 13(8). 
128 Ibid, art 13(4). 
129 Ibid, art 14(10) (requiring the imposition of effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions); ibid, recital (44), art 11(3) (endowing the European Commission with the 
coordination role for managing third-party relations).   
130 Case C-226/16 Eni SpA and Others v Premier ministre and Ministre de l'Environnement, 
de l'Énergie et de la Mer ECLI:EU:C:2017:1005, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras 32-
38.  
131 Ibid, para 33 (references omitted).  
132 Ibid, para 37. Treaty references to solidarity were also taken into account also in 
Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, Opinion of AG Kokott, paras 142-143.  
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IV. SOLIDARITY IN THE LAW OF UKRAINE-EU GAS MARKET 
INTEGRATION  
The 2016 Ukraine-EU Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Energy 
Partnership introduces the EU's Energy Union objectives into the bilateral 
cooperation agenda.133 Compared to previous political documents, the 
Memorandum's language is pronounced on solidarity: as noted elsewhere, 
'[c]ouched in diplomatic terms, the gas-related sections of the 2016 
Memorandum are still precise, principle-based and charged with 
solidarity'.134  
The question is how this impetus is reflected in the international law 
framework of Ukraine-EU relations in the gas sector, which by far is 
dominated by three major international treaties: EnC; the Ukraine-EU 
Association Agreement (UA-EU AA)135 and the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT).136 
EnC is 'the first multilateral treaty integrating a specific economic sector in 
south-east Europe',137 which highlights the special role of energy on the 
region's political and economic scene. EnC is said to have marked a 
qualitative transition in the EU's external energy policy thanks to its varied 
                                                 
133 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Energy Partnership between the 
European Union together with the European Atomic Energy Community and 
Ukraine (24 November 2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/ 
documents/mou_strategic_energy_partnership_en.pdf> accessed 02 December 
2018. 
134 Ielyzaveta Badanova, 'Ukraine-EU political agenda 1991-2016: premises for mutual 
solidarity obligations in the natural gas sphere' (2017) 2 Ukrainian Journal of 
International Law 17, 20.  
135 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of 
the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (signed 27 June 2014; entered into force 
01 September 2017) OJ L161/3 (UA-EU AA). 
136 Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17 December 1994; entered into force 16 April 
1998) 2080 UNTS 100 (ECT). 
137 'Summary of Treaty' (European Union External Action), <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?ste
p=0&redirect=true&treatyId=3421> accessed 02 December 2018.  
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membership and a relatively high degree of institutionalisation.138 UA-EU 
AA supplements EnC with additional bilateral mechanisms setting the 
current legal landscape of the Ukraine-EU partnership in the gas sector.  
Meanwhile, ECT has a different mission. It does not as such promote 
integration but rather seeks to 'establish a legal framework in order to 
promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, based on 
complementarities and mutual benefits, in accordance with the objectives 
and principles of the [Energy] Charter' (Article 2). In such a way, it highlights 
the shared values (market economy) and objectives (free flow of energy 
products, fair and equal treatment of energy investments) of its members, 
which are, however, pursued based on reciprocity (rather than mutuality). For 
instance, ECT seeks to reconcile divergent interests in relation to transit 
(interests of those who transport v. those who sell) through a set of duties 
imposed on transit countries.139 Compare this with the approach taken by 
EnC where transit as a category is eliminated140 and network users are 
enabled to sell gas freely within the integrated market area with the help of 
the entry-exit system for booking and pricing of gas transmission services.141 
Finally, ECT's voting system is largely unbalanced in favour of the EU,142 
which 'presents an inherent bias towards EU industrial and energy 
                                                 
138 Heiko Prange-Gstöhl, 'Enlarging the EU's internal energy market: Why would 
third countries accept EU rule export?' (2009) 37 Energy Policy 5296, 5297. 
139 Danae Azaria, Treaties on Transit of Energy via Pipelines and Countermeasures (Oxford 
University Press 2015) 67.  
140 Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, 'Transit Contracts in EU 
Member States: final results of ACER inquiry' (2013) 15-17 
<http://www.acer.europa.eu/Media/News/Pages/ACER-finds-that-gas-Transit-
Contracts-in-seven-EU-Member-States-do-not-comply-with-EU-rules-.aspx> 
accessed 02 December 2018. 
141 Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 {2009} OJ L211/36, art 13(1) (implemented 
in the Energy Community by Decision of the Ministerial Council of the Energy 
Community 2011/02-MC-EnC of 06 October 2011). 
142 Irina Kustova, 'A Treaty à la Carte? Some Reflections on the Modernization of the 
Energy Charter Process' (2016) 9 Journal of World Energy Law and Business 357, 
367.  
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interests'.143 This combination of reasons has arguably diminished ECT's role 
as a forum for stepping up energy cooperation between the EU and its 
neighbouring countries, including Ukraine.144 In these circumstances, 
further analysis concentrates on the solidarity footprint in EnC and UA-EU 
AA only.  
1. EnC: Solidarity Regime in the Making  
A. Solidarity as Constitutional Principle 
The Energy Community is founded on the resolve 'to establish among the 
Parties an integrated market in gas and electricity, based on common interest 
and solidarity'.145 Solidarity is thus named the key feature of a target model of 
sectoral (gas, electricity, oil; together referred to as Network Energy)146 
relations between the EU and the so-called 'Contracting Parties' (CPs), i.e. 
six Western Balkan countries, Ukraine, Moldova and, since recently, 
Georgia.147  
In terms of import/export profile, the Energy Community membership is 
relatively homogenous. As explained by one researcher, 'Ukraine, Energy 
Community countries and the EU in general as a community of consumer 
states have similar goals and priorities of the energy policy that produce 
natural motivation for creating a security space'.148 On a bilateral plane, 
already the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the 
field of energy recognised that 'in [this] field, the EU and Ukraine share 
convergent interests and both could benefit from the integration of their 
                                                 
143 Leal (n 99) 22.  
144 Kustova (n 142) 358. 
145 EnC, preamble.  
146 Ibid, art 2(2).  
147 'Who we are' (Energy Community) <https://www.energy-community.org/aboutus/ 
whoweare.html> accessed 02 December 2018.   
148 Oleksandr Sukhodolya, 'Energy Community and Ukraine: Objectives, Priorities 
and Problems of Cooperation' (in Ukrainian) (2016) 2(39) Stretagic Priorities 13, 15. 
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respective energy markets, thereby enhancing the energy security of the 
European continent'.149  
This convergence of interests is reflected in the Energy Community's task 
formulated with reference to five objectives: (1) 'a stable regulatory and 
market framework capable of attracting investment' (investment climate 
promotion); (2) 'a single regulatory space for trade in Network Energy' (trade 
climate promotion); (3) enhancement of the security of supply in the single 
regulatory space; (4) promotion of energy efficiency, environmental 
protection and renewables, as well as (5) development of Network Energy 
competition to profit from economies of scale.150 According to Article 3 EnC, 
this task is pursued through three types of 'activities', each having a 
progressively expanding geographical coverage:  
(i) implementation by CPs of the agreed EU acquis in energy, environment, 
competition, renewables, energy efficiency and statistics (EnC is viewed as a 
'core legal instrument that the EU uses [to] export … EU energy norms and 
regulations to neighbourhood countries and beyond'151);  
(ii) establishment of a regulatory regime for efficient market operation in-
between CPs and neighbouring EU Member States, in particular for 
Network Energy transmission and in cases of unilateral safeguard measures; 
and  
(iii) creation of a single energy market across the whole of the Energy 
Community, including joint response to energy supply disruptions and, 
potentially, a common external energy trade policy. 
In the gas market context, the achievement of these objectives dictates a high 
degree of mutuality, especially for the EU and Ukraine. This is particularly 
true for objectives (3) and (5).  
Already upon Ukraine's accession to EnC, the EU underscored that 'in the 
gas sector, the fulfilment of the obligations deriving from the accession to the 
                                                 
149 Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the field of energy between the 
European Union and Ukraine (01 December 2005) <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/ 
sites/ener/files/documents/2010_ukraine_mou.pdf> accessed 02 December 2018.  
150 EnC, art 2(1). 
151 Prange-Gstöhl (n 138) 5296.  
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Energy Community requires specific attention due to the importance of this 
sector for the security of supply of all Parties'.152 The EU, in turn, is 
instrumental in ensuring the security of gas supply to Ukraine through, inter 
alia, sustaining current gas transit flows153 and enabling access to its internal 
gas market.154 Other CPs mostly act as security-takers. However, their 
commitment starts to matter when new gas transit routes are being 
developed by the Russian exporter to bypass Ukraine.155 Thus, the full 
participation of the Energy Community membership is essential to the 
common cause of sustainable supply security.  
Likewise, the effective pooling of resources and needs within the Energy 
Community is essential for achieving benefits from economies of scale. This 
can be ensured through fair competition for gas throughout the integrated 
market area. As of now, the whole of the Energy Community faces similar 
challenges linked to the historical role of the dominant external gas source.156 
Here again mutuality plays a key role. 
                                                 
152 Decision of the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community 2009/04/MC-EnC 
of 17 December 2009. See Commission, 'Proposal for a Council Decision on 
establishing the European Community position within the Ministerial Council of 
the Energy Community' COM/2009/0632 final. 
153 See the Appeal by the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine to MPs and 
executive authorities of the EU concerning the enhancement of cooperation on 
energy security and potential risks of realization of gas transit projects to bypass 
Ukraine (in Ukrainian) dated 15 November 2016 No.1733-VIII 
<http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1733-19>.  
154 Since autumn 2015, National JSC Naftogaz of Ukraine secures necessary volumes 
of gas to cover the country's gas needs through physical reverse flows from the EU. 
See Naftogaz of Ukraine, 'Annual Report 2016: in the black' (2017) 73-74 
<http://www.naftogaz.com/files/Zvity/Anual_report_eng_170608.pdf> accessed 
02 December 2018. 
155 'Serbia, Russia revive gas pipeline plans' (Reuters, 09 March 2018) 
<https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFL5N1QR3QK> accessed 02 
December 2018.  
156 See above n 7. As to Ukraine, virtual reverse flows are blocked by current 
contractual arrangements involving Gazprom and in future would depend on the 
availability of gas transit through Ukraine. See Naftogaz of Ukraine, 'Annual 
Report 2014: Changing for the Future' (2015) 82-83 
<http://www.naftogaz.com/files/ 
Zvity/Naftogaz_Annual_Report_2014_engl.pdf> accessed 02 December 2018. 
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At first glance, investment and trade climate promotion reminds of ECT's 
regime. However, as exemplified above, EnC handles these objectives 
through community building, including by harmonising the basic regulatory 
framework for market and infrastructure operations. In the Energy 
Community, the prohibition of customs duties, quantitative restrictions and 
measures having equivalent effect157 is complemented with requirements of 
the EU's Third Energy Package158 and, since recently, Gas Network Codes.159 
These measures are designed to eliminate unnecessary restrictions on gas 
trade across borders and create a predictable investment regime. In addition, 
under the TEN-E Regulation160 a list of Projects of Energy Community 
Interest is developed, approved and updated resulting in prioritisation and 
facilitation of meaningful infrastructure upgrades.161 
In the meantime, Article 7 EnC speaks of equality within the Energy 
Community stating that discrimination within the scope of the Treaty shall 
be prohibited. It can be plausibly argued that EnC would have never been 
signed if it provided otherwise. The 'solidarity motive', i.e. the chance to 
place normative constraints on the EU's behaviour, can be a powerful driver 
for joining the Energy Community.162 From an international law viewpoint, 
EnC is an international treaty by virtue of which the parties have agreed to a 
set of mutual rights and obligations to be put in place through a specific 
institutional framework. It is recognised that 'the Energy Community has 
autonomous decision-making powers'.163 Within the EU legal order, EU 
                                                 
157 EnC, art 41.  
158 Decision of the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community 2011/02-MC-EnC 
of 06 October 2011.  
159 Decision No 2018/02/PHLG-EnC of the Permanent High-Level Reflection Group 
of the Energy Community of 22 January 2018. 
160 Decision of the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community 2015/09/MC-EnC 
of 16 October 2016. 
161 Decision of the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community 2016/11/MC-EnC of 
14 October 2016. 
162 In addition to those listed in Prange-Gstöhl (n 138) 5300-5302.  
163 Council Decision of 29 May 2006 on the conclusion by the European Community 
of the Energy Community Treaty {2006} OJ L 198/15, recital (11).  
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institutions and Member States, in the relevant part, are required to abide by 
the rules of this international treaty.164 
Yet, it is true to say that the EU has the driver's seat in the organisation. The 
European Commission has a mandate to move forward the integration 
process within the Energy Community.165 The EU has two (instead of one) 
representatives in the organisation's political bodies, the Ministerial Council 
and the Permanent High-Level Group,166 and several in the technical body, 
i.e. the Regulatory Board.167 On top of that, it enjoys a decisive vote in all 
these bodies.168 Compared to ECT, these peculiarities are less drastic and 
would arguably not suffice to ultimately distort the balance of powers. For 
instance, at least one infringement case against an EU Member State has 
officially been registered with the compliance monitoring body, Energy 
Community Secretariat (ECS).169  
The bigger issue with equality is posed by the alleged failure of EnC to 
adequately address the legal regime of interconnection points between the 
EU and CPs. According to EnC institutions, acts of the Ministerial Council 
adopted under Title II do not bind the EU, which means that 
implementation of EU's legislation at these points is not sanctioned by either 
the EU (where it is voluntary) or the Energy Community.170 This goes against 
the overall market integration efforts, especially in the context of Network 
                                                 
164 According to CJEU, 'the fact that [an international treaty] is intended essentially 
to promote the economic development of [a non-EU country] and therefore 
involves an imbalance in the obligations assumed by the Community towards the 
non-member country concerned' should not prevent the legal effects on this treaty 
in the EU. See Case C-162/00 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Beata Pokrzeptowicz-
Meyer ECLI:EU:C:2002:57, para 27. 
165 EnC, arts 4, 79. 
166 Ibid, arts 48, 54.  
167 Ibid, arts 59. 
168 Ibid, arts 83.  
169 Case ENC 01/17 <https://www.energy-community.org/legal/cases/2017/case0117 
BU.html> accessed 02 December 2018.  
170 Policy Guidelines by the Energy Community Secretariat on the Application of the 
Energy Community Acquis between the Contracting Parties and the European 
Union, 12 November 2014, PG 01/2014. 
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Code implementation.171 For example, the Capacity Allocation Mechanism 
Network Code (CAM NC)172 harmonises the procedures and timing for 
auctions at cross-border points, which makes it ineffective to introduce this 
code in CPs alone leaving out important interconnectors between CPs and 
EU Member States. On a similar note, a separate category of infrastructural 
projects (Projects of Mutual Interest) was created to compensate for the fact 
that in the Energy Community the above-mentioned TEN-E Regulation tied 
the granting of the status of a Project of Energy Community Interest to its 
previous qualification as a Project of Common Interest in the EU.173  
All in all, this is an urgent matter of constitutional significance that needs to 
be addressed in the Energy Community, so that the pronounced language of 
integration is fully realised. Without solidarity, integration will be reduced to 
either simple association (no mutuality) or expansion (no equality). 
B. Solidarity as General Legal Maxim 
Title I EnC incorporates Article 6 which is identical to Article 4(3) TEU, 
except for the reference to 'Parties' instead of 'Member States'. Under 
Article 94 EnC, the Energy Community institutions shall interpret 'any term 
of other concept used in this Treaty that is derived from European 
Community law' (let alone a set of wholesome sentences) in conformity with 
CJEU case law.174 This is a solid basis to argue that Article 6 EnC should 
convey the same basic scope of obligations as Article 4(3) TEU. While CJEU 
has given a rather restrictive interpretation to a similar provision in the 
context of one association agreement,175 that case related to an agreement 
                                                 
171 Energy Community Secretariat, 'The State of Gas Market Integration in the 
Energy Community: Special report for the CESEC High Level Group Meeting' 
(2018) 17 <https://www.energy-community.org/news/Energy-Community-
News/2018/06/29.html> accessed 02 December 2018. 
172 Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/459 of 16 March 2017 establishing a network 
code on capacity allocation mechanisms in gas transmission systems and repealing 
Regulation (EU) No 984/2013 {2017} OJ L 72/1. 
173 Recommendation R/2016/01/MC-EnC of 14 October 2016.   
174 Leal (n 99) 31. 
175 Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd ECLI:EU:C:1987:400, para 
24. 
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where no such interpretative guidance was given and dealt with direct effect 
(rather than the legal impact on public international law relations).176  
In practice, Article 6 EnC is widely employed in dispute settlement 
proceedings under EnC.177 On several occasions it even justified the 
recognition of a CP's treaty violation178 and the call for the EU to implement 
equivalent sanctions (e.g. suspension of financial support) against a 
persistently defaulted CP.179  
However, the full potential of legal integration through Article 6 EnC 
remains underexploited. On the one hand, EnC practice has developed in 
such a way that this article is invoked in most compliance cases. This differs 
from CJEU's approach where the relevant provision is not normally used in 
simple non-compliance proceedings.180 On the other hand, reliance neither 
on Article 6 nor on Article 7 EnC has seemingly allowed clarifying the above-
mentioned frustrating situation with interconnection points (despite the 
duty of uniformity under Article 4(3) TEU).  
Both these deficiencies can be attributed to the absence of an adjudicatory 
authority capable of enforcing EnC as well as of objectively resolving disputes 
where the EU is blamed. This fact naturally affects the selection of cases that 
are brought for consideration before the Ministerial Council as well as the 
sophistication and volume of legal reasoning in the infringement 
proceedings. When the dispute settlement is ultimately political, the 
motivation on the part of the monitoring body becomes not to bring to 
justice as many complaints as possible (and thus promote the unity of the legal 
                                                 
176 Ibid, para 13. 
177 In particular, it is relied upon mostly to allege the failure to lay down the basic legal 
framework such as the Third Energy Package or state aid rules. For more 
information on cases, see https://www.energy-community.org/legal/cases.html.  
178 See Case ECS-08/11 <https://www.energy-community.org/legal/cases/2011/ 
case0811BH.html> accessed 02 December 2018.  
179 Decision of the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community 2016/16/MC-EnC 
of 14 October 2016. 
180 Joined cases C-78/90, C-79/90, C-80/90, C-81/90, C-82/90 and C-83/90 Compagnie 
Commerciale de l'Ouest and others v Receveur Principal des Douanes de La Pallice Port 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:118, para 19 ('the wording of Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty is so 
general that there can be no question of applying them independently when the 
situation concerned is governed by a specific provision of the Treaty'). 
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order), but rather to pursue only those complaints which are likely to find 
support among political representatives (and thus promote the legitimacy of 
the legal order).  
C. Solidarity as Specific Obligation of Cross-border Assistance 
Regulation 2017/1938 is not yet part of the Energy Community acquis (neither 
is Regulation 994/2010), which means that the solidarity mechanism 
endorsed thereunder has not yet been extended to the rest of the Energy 
Community, including Ukraine. Currently CPs are only bound by adapted 
Directive 2004/67/EC,181 which is clearly obsolete. However, discussions on 
implementation of the new Regulation in the Energy Community have been 
ongoing for some time; more importantly, they include pronounced calls for 
comprehensive legal coverage (which would resolve the above-mentioned 
issue of cross-border application).182 Nevertheless, EnC itself and the 
unilateral practice thereunder point to the actual interplay of solidarity in 
Ukraine-EU relations as inspired by EnC. 
Under Article 37 EnC (contained in Title III), when the relevant Party takes 
temporary safeguard measures to address a sudden gas crisis, such measures 
need to 'cause the least possible disturbance in the functioning of the 
Network Energy market of the Parties, and not be wider in scope than is 
strictly necessary to remedy the sudden difficulties which have arisen' as well 
as 'not distort competition or adversely affect trade in a manner which is at 
variance with the common interest'. Falling short of establishing a positive 
duty of help, this provision represents a negative inter-state obligation to 
assist in a crisis by not aggravating the unfortunate stance. It effectively limits 
the choice of crisis management tools available to the parties,183 thus 
                                                 
181 Decision of the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community 2007/06/-MC-EnC 
of 06 October 2011. 
182 Energy Community Secretariat, 'Revised security of gas supply regulation covering 
the Energy Community is best guarantee for Europe's security of gas supply' (08 
April 2015) <https://www.energy-community.org/news/Energy-Community-
News/2015/ 
04/08.html> accessed 02 December 2018.   
183 There remains a question as to its binding effect on the EU as a whole (or on the 
European Commission which under Article 12(3) of Regulation 2017/1938 
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signalling the prevalence of the joint belief in the well-functioning market 
capable of handling a gas disruption. The mutual assistance mechanism 
organised under Article 46 EnC in the form of the Security of Supply 
Coordination Group should be helpful in implementing the relevant EnC 
provisions. Noteworthy, the preamble of the Procedural Act establishing this 
forum reads that 'securing energy supply through solidarity constitutes one 
of the main objectives of the Energy Community'.184 
In addition, Ukraine has voluntarily implemented all core requirements of 
Regulation 994/2010 in its 2015 Law on the Natural Gas Market.185 Article 
6(3) thereof reads that in case of a gas crisis the competent authority may take 
safeguard measures which shall, inter alia, 'not create unjustified obstacles to 
the flow of gas in gas transmission systems of Ukraine and of other state 
parties to the Energy Community', 'not create likely serious threat to the 
security of gas supply of the other state party of the Energy Community' and 
'not limit access to gas transmission systems or storages of Ukraine for 
customers established under the laws of the other state party of the Energy 
Community where this is technically possible and safe'.186 This wording is 
copied from Article 10(7) of Regulation 994/2010 (which later migrated to 
Article 11(6) of Regulation 2017/1938) and bears a self-imposed constraint on 
the freedom to act in a gas crisis linked to the membership in the Energy 
Community. The EU is yet to reciprocate these efforts as Regulation 
2017/1938 shows little extra solidarity towards CPs.187 The Commission's 
initiative which linked the provision of solidarity to CPs' compliance with 
their EnC commitments188 was stricken down in the final text. 
                                                 
coordinates crisis management during a regional or Union emergency) given the 
limited territorial coverage of Title III. 
184 Procedural Act 2008/02/MC-EnC of 11 December 2008.  
185 Energy Community Secretariat (n 171) 11. 
186 Law of Ukraine 'On the Natural Gas Market' of 09 April 2015 #329-VIII (Закон 
України 'Про ринок природного газу') <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/329-
19> accessed 02 December 2018.  
187 Regulation 2017/1938 (n 97) recital (57), art 16.  
188 Commission (n 109) 40-41. 
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2. UA-EU AA: Additional Instruments for Solidarity  
UA-EU AA is an all-encompassing cooperation agreement which marked a 
turning point in the history of Ukraine and Europe as a whole. Per the CJEU's 
interpretation, it 'create[s] special, privileged links with a non-member 
country which must, at least to a certain extent, take part in the [Union] 
system'.189 The treaty started to apply provisionally from 01 November 2014 
(the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement part – from 01 January 
2016) to ultimately come into force as of 01 September 2017. It repeals and 
replaces the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)190 concluded 
previously as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).191  
In contrast to PCA, UA-EU AA bears explicit references to solidarity in the 
context of energy cooperation (Article 338) as well as migration and asylum 
issues (preamble and Article 16). Reminiscent of EU Treaties, this approach 
highlights that on these topics interests of the EU and Ukraine are specially 
interrelated and interdependent. 
UA-EU AA explicitly 'builds on the commitment of the Parties to implement 
[EnC]'. This preambular statement is further expanded in Article 278 
whereby Ukraine's obligation to implement the EU acquis is automatically 
updated with the advent of the Energy Community acquis. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
189 Demirel (n 175) para 9.  
190 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities 
and their Member States, and Ukraine (adopted 14 June 1994; entered into force 01 
March 1998) OJ L49/3 (PCA). For the relation between the two agreements, see 
UA-EU AA, Articles 479, 486(6).  
191 Marise Cremona and Christophe Hillion, 'The Potential and Limits of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy' in Nathaniel Copsey and Alan Mayhew, 
European Neighbourhood Policy: the Case of Ukraine (SEI Seminar Paper Series No 1 
2007) 37-38. Promoting common values, ENP fell short on the rest of solidarity 
elements and is rightly described as 'clearly and unambiguously an EU policy 
directed at its neighbours rather than the creation of something new (a space or an 
area) or a shared enterprise (a process or partnership)' (ibid 39). Not surprisingly, 
PCA did not contain any references to solidarity or related provisions. In the gas 
sector, it simply confirmed the parties' attachment to the European Energy 
Charter and in a single article devoted to energy (Article 61) sketched the areas of 
bilateral cooperation.  
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Article 278(3) UA-EU AA prevents parties from using this treaty's dispute 
settlement fora to raise issues of EnC compliance.  
On the solidarity front, UA-EU AA supplements EnC with at least two 
additional instruments: the early-warning mechanism (EWM) under Annex 
XXVI to Chapter 1 of Title V and a strategic decision-making clause (Article 
274).    
Operating under Article 340 and Annex XXVI, EWM is designed to react to 
an emergency situation or a threat of such a situation defined as a significant 
disruption or physical interruption of gas supply between the EU and 
Ukraine. It presupposes a procedure for notification and joint assessment of 
the situation which should end up in a joint action plan. During this time, it 
is prescribed that the parties 'will do their utmost to minimise negative 
consequences for the other Party' and 'refrain from any actions unrelated to 
the ongoing emergency situation that could create or deepen the negative 
consequences for the supply of natural gas […] between Ukraine and the 
European Union'. Regulation 2017/1938 mandates that once EWM is 
activated, 'the Union should take appropriate action to try to defuse the 
situation'.192 It can arguably lead to the declaration of an early warning level 
crisis in EU Member States.193  
Article 274 UA-EU AA located in a special chapter on energy trade broadly 
relates to decision-making on gas infrastructure, namely gas transmission and 
storage facilities. Overall, it imposes a duty of consideration of the other 
party's interests during infrastructure developments and 'when developing 
policy documents regarding demand and supply scenarios, interconnections, 
energy strategies and infrastructure development plans' as well as a duty to 
cooperate on related matters of trade, sustainability and supply security. 
While the chapter where this provision is located deals with both gas and 
electricity, this article focuses on gas, which can be explained by the search 
for a commitment to safeguard Ukraine's gas transit status. It was, for 
instance, invoked by National JSC Naftogaz of Ukraine as a justification to 
                                                 
192 Regulation 2017/1938 (n 105) recital (59).  
193 Ibid, art 11(1)(a).  
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sue the European Commission for amending the access regime of the OPAL 
pipeline in Germany.194  
At the moment, UA-EU AA does not operate as a self-sufficient solidarity 
regime. It relies on the institutional and constitutional basis of the Energy 
Community while at the same time reinforcing bilateral cooperation and 
communication. Nevertheless, the situation can change if the solidarity 
potential of the Energy Community is not developed. For instance, the 
already mentioned issue of cross-border application of the Energy 
Community acquis could be resolved on a bilateral level by extending the 
internal market treatment to this sector under Annex XVII of UA-EU AA.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The present article illustrates that in understanding an ambiguous concept of 
public international law, one can rely on its application in a particular 
international law regime, including in a very specific and technical area such 
as gas market regulation. This epistemological approach is rarely used 
because, on the one hand, it requires quite diversified knowledge and, on the 
other, it may be difficult to duplicate in respect of each problematic notion. 
However, it has proven effective in this case where we have looked at the 
definition and normative force of solidarity.  
In particular, we have established that early teachings of solidarity and its 
later doctrinal applications can be summarised in such a way as to produce its 
(relatively) non-contentious definition and a sketch of its normative powers. 
Formulated as a combination of three elements (common values and 
objectives, mutuality, and equality), solidarity features as a fundamental 
socio-political notion underlying the EU legal order and, in a way described 
by its first teachers, emits legal rules and mechanisms that serve to solidify 
this particular community. Apart from a constitutional dimension, solidarity 
takes the form of a general legal maxim of Article 4(3) TEU as well as of the 
duty to safeguard gas supply to a closed circle of customers under Regulation 
2017/1938. Technicalities of a solidarity measure of last resort under this 
                                                 
194 Case T-196/17 Action brought on 27 March 2017 – Naftogaz of Ukraine v 
Commission {2017} OJ C 151/45. 
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Regulation provide an especially interesting case of how solidarity could be 
translated into legal rules and procedures. 
When these dimensions operate in the legal framework of Ukraine-EU gas 
market integration, they exemplify the rule of solidarity in international law. 
The search for solidarity in these relations has led to the incorporation of the 
Energy Community; dissatisfaction with the level of mutuality and equality 
in this forum could engender the creation of a new solidarity regime under 
UA-EU AA. EnC, which possesses fundamental characteristics of a solidarity 
regime, contains a mechanism of self-preservation, i.e. Article 6 analogous to 
Article 4(3) TEU. The full potential encrypted thereunder needs to be 
explored and promoted in practice upon the initiative of EnC bodies which 
seem to be more cognisant of illuminating CJEU jurisprudence. Finally, 
solidarity is embodied in duties of emergency assistance between Ukraine 
and the EU: while mostly negative or procedural in nature, they have a strong 
tendency to be complemented with positive duties of help (using the format 
of Regulation 2017/1938). 
The methodology applied in this article can be expanded to other fields 
where solidarity engrained in EU law migrates to international law regimes 
fuelled by integrationist forces (e.g. migration, disaster relief, etc). This looks 
like a viable way to finally establish solidarity, which historically started as a 
legal notion, as a valid international law concept.  
